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Abstract 
In the last decades Antitrust Authorities have invested in the development of aggressive anti 
cartel programs in order to prevent and detect cartel cases. In this context were introduced 
leniency programs that have became a central tool on cartel prosecution. These programs are a 
legal revelation mechanism in which firms that report their participation in a cartel are granted 
with fine reductions, total immunity or even rewards. There are several dimensions over 
which leniency programs can be designed which have an important role determining its 
effectiveness. This thesis provides a survey on this topic and performs an economic analysis 
of the European Commission‟ leniency program. We conclude that the program is effective in 
the sense that is able to induce self-reports and therefore increase the number of cartels 
detected and the level of fines imposed. The program allows detecting long lasting cartels and 
decrease cartel size. However, there is some room for improvement. The number of repeated 
offenders is substantial and it‟s not found a significant reduction on investigation duration. 
The treatment of ringleaders and private damages actions are other issues that arouse 
discussion and are carefully addressed in this thesis.       
Resumo  
Nas últimas décadas as Autoridades da Concorrência têm investido no desenvolvimento de 
programas anti-carteis agressivos de modo a prevenir e a detectá-los. Neste contexto, foram 
introduzidos os programas de clemência que se tornaram uma ferramenta fulcral na luta 
contra os cartéis. Estes programas são um mecanismo de revelação legal no qual as empresas 
que denunciam a sua participação num cartel são recompensadas com reduções na coima, 
imunidade ou até mesmo compensações. São vários os aspectos sobre os quais os programas 
de clemência podem ser concebidos o que tem um papel importante na determinação da sua 
eficácia. Esta tese apresenta um resumo da literatura sobre este tema e realiza uma análise 
económica do programa de clemência da Comissão Europeia. Conclui-se que o programa é 
eficaz no sentido em que consegue gerar denuncias e assim aumentar o número de cartéis 
detectados e coimas aplicadas. O programa permite detectar cartéis de longa duração e 
diminuir a sua dimensão. Contudo, existe algum espaço para melhorias. O número de 
reincidentes é substancial e não foi encontrada uma redução significativa da duração das 
investigações. A abordagem aos líderes dos cartéis e às acções de indemnização privada são 
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1.  Introduction 
A cartel consists in the joint coordination of firms‟ efforts with the aim of increasing 
profits through market manipulation, reducing or eliminating competition. The primordial 
collusive action under a cartel is the concerted increase in prices, if possible to the monopoly 
level. However, agreements may include many other collusive activities as setting of output 
levels, allocation of market shares, delineation of sales territories and customers, prevention 
of new firms‟ entry or avoiding the expansion of firms that do not belong to the cartel, sharing 
investments in capacity or in R&D. Nowadays AA consider most cartels an illegal activity, 
once the cartel‟s joint maximized profits are achieved at the expense of the consumer welfare. 
In the US cartels are considered a criminal activity.
1
 That is not the case in Europe. In the EC 
Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits cartels, but states that some collusive agreements, e.g. 
related with R&D should not be considered illegal.
2
  
A crucial objective of AA on competition law enforcement is the prevention and 
detection of cartel cases. To deter cartel formation AA pretend to weaken the profitability and 
stability of cartels by the threat of onerous and prompt expected sanctions, among other 
mechanisms. Indeed, trust among potential cartel members may be undermined increasing the 
probability that one of them could lose confidence and denounce the other potential partners. 
Relatively to the detection objective, AA seek to discover and destroy the cartels that were not 
deterred, by inducing them to voluntarily interrupt the illegal practice and report their 
involvement, or by direct fieldwork with dawn raids. Achieving these objectives is not 
straightforward since there are substantial assessment difficulties. Cartels have a covert nature 
which implies that they are resource intensive to detect, investigate and prosecute. In contrast, 
AA have finite resources whereby the time and effort dedicated to cartels could be spend 
combating other types of anti-competitive behaviour. 
Cartels are, in a sense, like organized criminal activities as they take the form of 
ongoing relationships, which presupposes flows of present and future expected benefits and 
costs. Knowing that the cooperation between several agents can give rise to problems like 
free-riding, hold-up and moral hazard, for a cartel to be feasible it must be able to monitor 
cartel members‟ compliance with the agreed terms, setting penalty mechanisms in case of 
deviation. Therefore, firms need to credibly threaten react with price cuts to possible 
                                                             
1 See Sherman Act in Appendix 1.  
2 See Article 101 of the TFEU in Appendix 1. 
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deviation of cartel members, avoiding their temptations to cheat for fear of provoking an 
undesirable price war or other retaliation actions. Another important feature is the fact that 
cartel members end up having information about each other evolvement in the illegal activity 
and can report that evidence to third parties as AA.  
When a firm is considering joining a cartel there are three main questions that it 
should address: what is the colluding gain, what is the likelihood of being caught and 
condemned and what is the punishment if convicted. Firms have an incentive to collude if the 
benefit of collusion is higher than the risk and severity of the punishment.  Thereby, AA seek 
to increase the probability of cartel detection and punishment (fines or even imprisonment) in 
order to maximize cartel deterrence. Besides the probability of detection and the level of  
punishment there are many other factors that influence the collusion benefits and the 
deviation gains making collusion less or more likely. Among the factors that facilitate 
collusion, we can highlight entry barriers, symmetry between firms regarding their market 
position and strategy which facilitates coordination, higher degree of market concentration 
and a positive demand growth rate expected to be maintained in the long-run. Oppositely, a 
high number of firms within a cartel decrease the collusion benefits and difficult coordination. 
Collusion is also more difficult in industries with less price transparency, meaning that the 
observability of the prices is reduced, increasing the difficulty of detect deviators. 
Furthermore, there are factors that difficult collusion by making deviation more attractive. 
One factor is the rigidity in prices that makes firms to take longer to apply the punishment in 
case of deviation. Thus, it is more difficult to sustain collusion if the prices are not flexible. A 
transitory upward shock in demand is other factor since gives incentives to deviate to benefit 
from an increased temporary demand. When there is substantial excess capacity, so that the 
deviator has sufficient capacity to take over the entire market, collusion is more difficult. 
Other factor that can be considered is low brand loyalty, meaning that is easy to steal market 
share from rivals in case of deviation. Finally, there are factors that affect both sides of the 
incentive constraint the deviation benefits and the punishment and therefore can either 
facilitate or difficult collusion. That‟s the case of elastic demand and homogenous goods. 
High demand elasticities discourage collusion, as deviation is more likely, but as punishment 
is less costly for non deviating firms, collusion is facilitated. With respect to homogenous 
goods, by allowing capturing a more important market share, it incentives deviation and 




It has been argued
3
 that cartels will inevitably dissolve without AA intervention due to 
its intrinsic instability, but AA have invested in the development of aggressive anti cartel 
programs. In that context were introduced LPs that nowadays became a central tool in the 
fight against cartels. A LP is a legal revelation mechanism in which firms that report their 
involvement in a cartel, or cooperate with the AA, are granted with fine reductions, total 
immunity or in some cases rewards. 
Historically, promises of lenient treatment have been commonly used in war 
situations, for the exchange of information as a standard tool. The concept of divide et impera 
(divide and rule), highlighted by Spagnolo (2004),  was used by Julius Cesar and other 
commanders as a strategy of breaking coalitions of enemies by striking advantageous deals 
with one or few of them. Also Nazi occupants have used rewards to induce enemies to 
become informants. More recently, this system allowed finding the location of some Al-
Qaeda terrorists. However, this lenient treatment did not have a general rule as it was decided 
case by case. Therefore, what is new and make LPs somewhat special are its ex-ante general 
and public characteristics. LPs are ex ante because they are directed to cartel members that 
have not yet been identified. They are general since they are anonymous and available to 
anyone who is in a codified situation and behaves in a certain way. Finally they are public 
since they are automatic and publicly advertised.  
Potentially, LPs undermine the trust between cartel members which is the crucial and 
cohesive element that keeps cartels operating. By increasing the risk that one of them will 
unilaterally report the cartel to enjoy the benefit of leniency, LPs help prevent cartel 
formation, which is called the deterrence effect. They deter firms‟ involvement in 
anticompetitive activities because they know that it only takes one cartel member to 
whistleblow to bring down all the firms involved. Hence, the reasoning regarding cartel 
deterrence is that if a firm is more profitable by itself than joint in a cartel, it will not be part 
of it. Therefore, AA search for leniency schemes that lead to a situation in which is in a firm 
best interest not joining a cartel. In what regards the improvement in cartel detection, the 
reasoning is the same, undetected cartel members are induced to spontaneously self-report 
cartels that had not been discovered. Then, the main issue regarding the optimal design of LP 
is how to extract this freely available information from cartel members.  
There are several dimensions over which LP can be designed. They have an important 
role determining the effectiveness of the program in deterring and detecting cartels. One 
                                                             
3 See for example Stigler (1964) 
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dimension is the time at which the cooperation starts: before an investigation is opened (new 
case) or after the formal investigation has started. The time ordering of reporters (first or later 
reporters), their behaviour during and after the investigation and their role in the collusive 
agreement (ringleaders or minor partners) are other dimensions considered. The question of 
recidivism is also addressed on LP design. Also the question whether the norms in place entail 
personal or only corporate liability. Other crucial dimension is the design of fine reductions or 
positive rewards that should be in accordance with all the above elements. And finally, it is 
necessary to define the degree of discretionary power of AA applying the rules announced. 
This thesis discusses the rationale of the ECLP, trying to assess how the way it is 
designed affects its effectiveness on cartels prosecution. The discussion is based on an 
extensive literature review and in a descriptive statistic performed with data collected from 
the EC‟ case decisions. The cartel size, investigation and cartel duration, fines, timing of 
leniency application and fine reductions granted are some of the variables examined. This 
descriptive analysis contributes to the existing literature by extending the data set from 1980 
to 2015, which allows to compare the situations before and after the LP‟ introduction. 
Moreover, it allows comparing the performance of the 1996, 2002 and 2006 leniency notices.  
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 survey theoretical and empirical studies 
organizing them according with the most relevant LP‟ dimensions. In section 3 is performed 
an economic analysis of the ECLP. Section 4 concludes and suggests some further research.  
















2. LPs and cartel activity: a survey 
It seems reasonable to admit that LP increase the number of convicted cartels, but its 
effect on cartel deterrence is not straightly observable, as the number of existing cartels is not 
known. An increase in convicted cartels could be just a result of an increase in cartel activity. 
Even assuming that LPs have a cartel deterrence effect, it is still necessary to analyze whether 
differently designed programs would have a better performance. This argument highlights the 
importance of theoretical, experimental, and econometric research. 
2.1 Theory Studies 
Most literature on LPs is based on theoretical models that try to identify their most 
efficient design. The first approximation of a model of information exchange and leniency is 
the Prisoner‟s Dilemma.  The majority of the models used are game theoretic dynamic models 
based on the concept of the Prisoner‟s Dilemma.  
Initially, literature focused only on isolated crimes committed by single agents. Becker 
(1968) showed that optimal policies to combat criminal behaviour are part of an optimal 
allocation of resources. In this line of reasoning, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) showed that a 
system that includes self-reporting saves law enforcement resources.  According to them, LPs 
reduce the social cost of collusion by restricting the investigation only to the fraction of the 
population that does not report and by the early cessation of cartel activity. Using a simple 
setting they showed that leniency allows achieving the same deterrence level but with AA‟ 
lower costs. The role of self-reporting in reducing auditing costs in environmental regulation 
was discussed by Malik (1993). Using a principal-agent framework, found that the 
introduction of self-reporting decreases the need of firms auditing but increases punishment. 
Innes (1999) highlighted the benefits of granting leniency treatment to self-reporting 
wrongdoers that committed an environmental damage. Hence, LPs allow the earlier detection 
of environmental damaging activities, assuring a faster compensation to victims and reducing 
social harm. 
2.1.1Leniency after Investigation Opening – Plea bargaining  
The concept of plea bargaining refers to the situation in which firms cooperate with 
AA, reporting relevant information, only when their cartel has been discovered and an 
investigation was opened. Motta and Polo (2003) made a seminal contribution, explicitly 
addressing the effects of LPs on cartels using a dynamic analytical structure. In their model 
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firms strategically interact in an infinite repeated oligopoly game, choosing whether or not to 
collude given the probability of being detected and prosecuted by the AA
4
, which has an 
exogenous budget constraint that can be allocated to the detection and prosecution of detected 
cartels. Leniency is only available for colluding firms that only begin its collaboration during 
prosecution. In the model there are only two collusive strategies: firms never report and go 
back to collusion after the investigation, playing Nash forever as soon as one of them reports 
or firms report to the AA whenever an investigation is opened, not colluding for some period 
of time, but then sliding back to collusion. Two main simplifying assumptions are considered. 
The first is that firms sustain a collusive agreement based on trigger strategies. The second is 
that a deserting firm cannot be condemned for having been part of a cartel nor report his 
former partners. Under this simplifying assumptions, cartel members only report when they 
all agree to do so as part of their collusive strategy. Thus, LPs do not induce non-
cooperatively self-report. The central result of Motta and Polo (2003) is that LPs have a pro-
collusive effect by reducing the overall sanctions, but in turn increases the ex-post deterrence 
since induces cartel members to cheat and break up the collusive agreement. LPs increase the 
probability of conviction and self-reporting become an equilibrium outcome. The positive 
effect on deterrence makes prosecution faster, cheaper and more effective. Considering that 
AA have limited resources, the positive effect dominates the negative on. There are also some 
secondary and less intuitive conclusions. One of them is that the same lenient treatment 
should be offered to all firms independent of the order with which they report. And if AA 
have sufficient resources to deter cartels with fines and inspections, it should not introduce 
LPs. Therefore, LPs are a second best instrument that is only optimal when the authorities‟ 
resources are limited.    
Harrington (2008) also considers that leniency is applied in the prosecution stage. The 
novel feature of this model is that when a cartel is put under investigation firms may 
precipitate to report information in a non-cooperative manner under a sufficiently generous 
LP. Such rushes do not occur in Motta and Polo (2003). Harrington (2008) uses a repeated 
oligopoly model that enriches previous analysis by considering the probability of successful 
prosecution as a stochastic, continuous and fluctuating variable. Indeed, the probability of 
conviction is allowed to change over time taking any value from [0, 1], while Motta and Polo 
(2003) restricted the probability to take only two values, one of which zero. The conclusion is 
that when the probability of successful conviction is high there is an equilibrium report during 
                                                             
4 The probability is allowed to change over time but it is restricted to take only two values, one and zero. 
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prosecution. However, with a low probability the equilibrium is not collaborating or report 
even in the prosecution stage. Therefore, a more lenient program might induce firms to switch 
from a non self-report equilibrium to an equilibrium in which all firms self-report. 
2.1.2 Leniency before Investigation Opening – Ex ante Deterrence  
Plea bargaining do not capture the most novel and distinctive feature of LPs, which are 
the ex ante effects relative to cartels that have not yet been detected rather than just the 
improvement in prosecution. A different focus is on ex ante deterrence by restricting LPs to 
firms that spontaneously report their cartel involvement before an investigation was open.   
In this context, Hinloopen (2003) using a dynamic oligopoly model where the 
probability of detection changes over time, shows that cartel ex ante deterrence increases with 
the generosity of the LP. Hence, LPs‟ effectiveness is enlarged by the increase in the fine 
reduction level and the increase in the probability of cartel detection. Also Spagnolo (2004) 
developed a stylized dynamic model of self-reinforcing collusive agreements, assuming that 
whenever a cartel is detected it is also convicted (contrary to Motta and Polo), which allows 
to focus on the impact of LPs on cartels that are not already under investigation. He shows 
that a “moderate” LP, where reduced fines are bounded to be non-negative, may make 
collusion harder to sustain having three effects: the protection from fines effect, the protection 
from punishment effect and the direct deterrence effect by making cartels more risky. 
Spagnolo (2004) also analysis the impact of a more “courageous” leniency that offers rewards 
to whistleblowers that will be addressed later.  
Chen and Harrington (2007) analyzed the deterrence effects of LPs considering a 
dynamic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogeneous goods and where the probability of 
detection and conviction is endogenous and sensitive to price changes. Therefore, a cartel 
selects a price path that ensures compliance from all firms and tries to avoid raising 
suspicions that they are colluding. In that setting, the introduction of a LP will impact the 
price path through its influence on the incentive compatibility constraints. Through numerical 
simulations, they show that when leniency is significantly generous it achieves positive 
results in terms of direct deterrence, since LPs either deter cartel formation or reduce the 







2.1.3 Leniency restricted to first reporter 
As mentioned previously, the time ordering of reporters, (that is whether the lenient 
treatment is given just to the first reporter or to later ones), is a crucial element in the LP 
design. According to Feess and Walz (2004a) if only the first reporter can apply for leniency 
and the other cartel members are forced to pay high fines, ex-ante deterrence is maximized 
since self-reporting become a credible threat. The same concludes Motchenkova (2004) using 
a dynamic model that tries to capture the time dimension of the rush to report idea. Limiting 
amnesty only to the first reporter is crucial to induce such rush for reporting. On the other 
hand, less strict LPs that are generous also to the following reports are found to produce 
negative side effects as the increase of cartel duration. Harrington (2008), beyond 
corroborating this idea, ads that is optimal to restrict amnesty to the first reporting firm only 
when the additional information is sufficiently valuable regarding its impact on the likelihood 
that the investigation ends with a successful condemnation.  
Chen and Rey (2012) also confirm the advantage of restricting leniency to the first 
informant, but consider the case of keep offering leniency once an investigation is underway. 
Also Spagnolo (2000a) defends the restriction of maximum benefits to first reporters, since 
allowing more agents to obtain leniency reduces deterrence by reducing the number of cartel 
members that must pay the full fine. The model used to reach this conclusion relies on the 
Motta and Polo assumption that a cartel member which deviates by undercutting the cartel 
price is no longer subject to be condemned for his past collusive behavior. 
In a context of asymmetric information between the AA and cartel members, 
Sauvagnat (2010) also confirm the advantage of restricting leniency to the first reporter. 
Therefore, the optimal scheme involves a single informant rule, which makes amnesty 
function as a lure, since all cartel members face the same unilateral incentives to blow the 
whistle. 
2.1.4 Minimum Information requirements  
The quality and relevance of the evidence required for reporters to obtain immunity is 
another important nuance to include in theoretical analysis on LP. Harrington (2008) was one 
of the few to analyze this critical issue of how valuable the reported information must be to 
make awarding amnesty worthwhile. Harrington (2008) considers as hard the information that 
is verifiable by third parties (like judges) and leads to sure conviction and soft the information 
like testimonies not supported by documents that are not sufficient to give immunity. The 
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probability that an open investigation end up with a conviction is taken as a continuous 
stochastic variable. Therefore, if this probability is high, further information from 
whistleblowers has little value, if is low the additional information is higher valuable. 
Exploiting this variation, Harrington (2008) shows that to maximize desistance, leniency 
should be granted only if it increases significantly the likelihood that prosecution traduces in 
successful conviction. To avoid strategic or distorted reports, authorities must always deny 
leniency or even consider aggravated sanctions for reporters that withheld some information.  
Also Feess and Walzl (2004b) analyzed the minimum level of evidence that should be 
reveled in order to obtain leniency. Through the exploration of the differences between the 
USLP and the ECLP, found that a more informed reporting firm should receive a more 
generous compensation then a less informed cartel member. According to their results, grant 
total amnesty to cartel members that provide a low evidence level is not optimal. Thus, 
granting always full fine reduction, as occurs under the USLP to the first self-reporting firm, 
is suboptimal. Cloutier (2011) extends this analysis by setting the study in the period after an 
investigation has started rather than in the pre-investigation period.  Using a repeated game 
similar to the prisoner's dilemma, Cloutier (2011) shows that by conditioning the imposed fine 
on the quality of the evidence firms will apply more often than they would in the 
unconditional situation, providing higher quality information. Thus, a more generous LP 
induces firms to report higher quality information. 
2.1.5 Asymmetries 
Another interesting issue that can be introduced in theoretical models is the existence 
of asymmetric information or asymmetries within a cartel. In this context, it can be analyzed 
the case in which is AA that have private information unknown by cartel members. This type 
of asymmetry was addressed by Sauvagnat (2010) who designates as a fool's game the period 
following an investigation, in which AA pretend having more relevant information than it 
actually have. Indeed, AA want cartel members to believe that the risk of conviction is 
eminent in order to induce them to report their own information to avoid higher sanctions. In 
this context, the model used is built on the idea that AA may run an investigation against a 
cartel even having very limited evidence of its culpability. Once the amount of evidence held 
is private information of AA, firms may be tempted to self-report and provide hard 
information that enables his conviction. However, AA should choose a generous LP design, 
granting full amnesty, when the probability of successful prosecution is low since it 
diminishes the risk of conviction faced by cartel members and therefore lowers the likelihood 
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of leniency applications. Thereby, is desirable offering more leniency in order to 
counterbalances the dilution in the risk of conviction, allowing the AA to open more 
successful investigations.  
Other asymmetry in information that can be addressed is the possibility of firms to 
have private information regarding the probability of a successful prosecution and conviction 
by the AA without the cooperation of cartel members. This is precisely the key modification 
introduced by Harrington (2013) who distinguishes between prosecution and pre-emption 
effects. The first effect is related with the fact that firms apply for leniency because of the fear 
of being convicted. Regarding the pre-emption effect, a firm decides to apply for leniency due 
to its concern that another cartel member apply for it first, even if the firm believes that the 
probability of conviction is low. Harrington (2013) developed a model that explores antitrust 
policies that aim to magnify the pre-emption effect to better understand firms‟ incentives to 
apply for LPs. He shows that the presence of private information has a significant effect in the 
way LPs are able to generate convictions, since the pre-emption effect creates a multiplier 
effect with an increase in the prosecution effect. Marvão (2013) presents an extension of the 
model used by Harrington (2013) since besides allowing firms to have private information 
consider that firms are heterogeneous in terms of sales. The theoretical result confirms the 
existence of a pre-emption effect but adds that the decision of reporting is also influenced by 
firms‟ sales level and not only by the perceived probabilities of detection and conviction. 
Indeed, she finds that the turnover of the first reporter after an investigation was open is 
higher than the other cartel members. To support the theoretical model uses a database 
composed by cartels convicted in the US and by the EC and the OLS estimation method. The 
empirical analysis confirm the theoretical result since reveal that chief witnesses tend to be 
repeat offenders in the case of the EC and cartel leaders in the US which are often the firms 
with higher sales.  
Besides asymmetries in information may exist also asymmetries within the cartel 
regarding the firm‟s dimension and the markets in which they operate. Motchenkova and Van 
der Laan (2005), using a dynamic repeated duopoly model similar to Motta and Polo (2003), 
evaluate the deterrence effects of LPs taking into account these asymmetries. They consider 
that cartel members face other costs beyond fines, namely reputation costs that are associated 
with the reduction on sales in the markets firms operate apart from the market of the 
convicted cartel. Thus, they show that colluding firms that are heterogeneous in size and 
degree of market diversification will react in a different way to the introduction of LPs if their 
conviction has significant negative reputation effects. Larger and more diversified firms are 
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present in more markets than those in which they are colluding. Thus, it‟s possible that the 
negative reputation effects have repercussions on the markets in which the firm cannot avoid 
the losses with leniency. Therefore, larger firms have less incentive to enter in a cartel and 
higher incentives to keep the cartel secret in case they enter.  
2.1.6 Ringleaders  
Cartel members who assume a leading role in the cartel are usually called ringleaders. 
They grant cartel stability and functionality by organizing the first meetings, collecting and 
distributing relevant data and ensuring a continuous communication between participants. 
According with Herre, Mimra and Rasch (2012), despite ringleaders be crucial to cartel 
stability, it‟s not clear that they need to be necessarily the firms with larger dimension or 
relevance in the market. Oppositely, Ganslandt, Persson and Vasconcelos (2008) show that 
ringleaders tend to be large firms since have firm-specific indivisible costs associated with 
collusion as the cost incurred when protecting the cartel from potential entrants. Also Bos and 
Wandschneider (2011) found that a defining feature of ringleaders is their market position, 
since in 11 of the 14 cases analyzed the ringleader was the largest firm in terms of market 
share.  
Kobayashi (1992) provided the first economic analysis of the existence of asymmetry 
between cartel members regarding their role in the cartel. In this sense he considers that since 
ringleaders are the members that have more information about the cartel and the other 
wrongdoers, for the probability of conviction to be maximized, it is optimal to lower their 
penalties. In turn, suggests harsher penalties to less culpable cartel members. Similarly to the 
case of rewards, the implementation of this conclusion can presuppose a social disapproval 
since ringleaders are the cartel member that are most responsible and culpable for the cartel 
and therefore for the social damage.  
Herre, Mimra and Rasch (2012) also address the impact of ringleader discrimination 
on cartel‟s stability. They found that both the approach of allowing and excluding ringleaders 
from leniency may be used as an effective tool to fight against cartels, depending on the 
magnitude of evidence held by the ringleader. If the ringleader relative evidence about the 
cartel activity is high its exclusion from LPs has no impact on cartel stability. Therefore, 
differencing the treatment of ringleaders plays no role in this case since they will never report. 
If ringleader‟s relative evidence is small, excluding it from LPs creates an asymmetry among 
cartel members, making collusion harder to sustain. This is still more valid if we added the 
fact that the AA has a large probability of successful conviction. Finally, if the level of 
16 
 
evidence held by ringleaders is intermediate or if the AA has a small probability of successful 
prosecution, allowing them to obtain leniency is the best option, since their exclusion 
facilitates collusion. Likewise, Chen, Ghosh and Ross (2015) found that the exclusion of 
ringleaders can have ambiguous effects on the elimination of cartels. By one hand, excluding 
ringleaders destroys some of the potential benefit that leniency was intended to generate, 
making more credible the ringleader commitment to its partners and contributing to cartel 
stability. By the other hand, its exclusion creates an asymmetry between cartel members by 
punish ringleaders in a more severe way, reducing their incentive to commit the crime.  
The effects of ringleaders‟ exclusion from LPs on the collusive price level are 
explored by Bos and Wandschneider (2011). Attempting to deal with the fact that very little is 
known about the nature and role of ringleaders, they have conducted an informative survey of 
75 European cartel cases, evidencing the frequency and characteristics of ringleaders. 
Between 2000 and 2011 they found that in 14 of the 75 cases the EC identified a ringleader. 
Performing then a theoretically analysis, they conclude that for the majority of the cases in 
which collusion is sustainable, impeding ringleaders to obtain leniency leads to lower prices. 
Nevertheless, its exclusion may lead to higher prices but only under a set of restrictive 
conditions. Specifically, it is needed that the profit-maximizing price is not sustainable when 
ringleaders can apply for leniency and that its incentive compatibility constraint is less tight 
when they cannot apply. This last restriction requires a sufficient number of cartel members 
and a substantial fine reduction for the first reporting. 
2.1.7 Personal liability and whistleblowers’ reward schemes 
Personal liability and the possibility of grant rewards to whistleblowers are other 
dimensions that could be consider in LPs design. Aubert, Rey and Kovaric (2006) defend 
personal liability and propose the introduction of compensations for individual reporters, 
showing that it have a larger deterrence effect than reduced fines. The model used allows 
employees to directly cash monetary rewards when reporting their own firm‟s collusive 
behaviour. The authors show that individual rewards can be more effective than the ones 
granted to firms, or can be seen as a useful complement of corporate amnesty programs. The 
basic idea is that if AA offer rewards to employees that report evidence, then colluding firms 
will have to pay additional bonuses to pay for the silence of the informed employees, which 
increases the colluding costs and makes collusion less attractive and more fragile and 
unsustainable. Since firms must pay a bonus to each informed employee the impact of this 
policy is multiplied when compared with a corporate one. Other relevant fact is that, when 
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personal liability adds to corporate liability induces managers and executives to report more 
frequently, since the possibility of imprisonment presupposes a greater loss when compared 
with the fines paid by a firm or even it possible bankruptcy. Aubert, Rey and Kovaric (2006) 
also highlight that the possibility of individual leniency gives employees an additional 
bargaining power to obtain a better employment contract with higher wages which increases 
even more collusion costs. 
Besides its positive effects, Aubert, Rey and Kovaric (2006) also analyzed the possible 
adverse effects of rewards and its potential implementation issues. An adverse effect 
highlighted is the possibility of deter or discourage productive and valuable intra-firm and 
inter-firm cooperation.  Namely, a legitimate joint venture that restricts the freedom of its 
participants could erroneously be considered as illicit collusion by increasing the incentive to 
report it with the purpose of getting the reward. Regarding the potential implementation issues 
they are related with the concern that may arise from the large size of the rewards that is 
needed to deter collusion. In this context, the first question highlighted is a problem of 
credibility since the limited budget impedes the authority to credibly commit to large rewards. 
The second issue highlighted is related with its political implementability, since public 
opinion has difficulty in accepting the idea of transfer high amounts to firms that belonged to 
a cartel. The last problem addressed is that a reward program generates more incentives to 
collude since it could become profitable for firms to collude and then report or to „take turns‟ 
for reporting collusion.  
 In the context of individual leniency there is also some sociological literature which 
evidences the problems faced by whistleblowers. According to Spagnolo (2008) individual 
reporters face severe punishment from their former partners and from the business community 
in general during the several years that prosecution may lasts and even before it ends. Also 
Alford (2002) highlighted that whistleblowers have difficulties finding work and experience 
trouble in their social and private life after reporting. Indeed, colleagues, friends, neighbours 
and, chiefly, potential employers turn against them. In some cases even family members 
reproach their behaviour. According to him, about half of all whistleblowers get fired and 
many of them lose their homes and then their families too. Thus, whistleblowers must be 
generously rewarded and protected in order for them to report. Polo and Motta (2005) have 
stressed that despite the difficulty to maintain secrecy over the identity of cooperating 
companies, when we consider individual leniency there is some more scope for trying to 
protecting the identity of witnesses when compared with corporate leniency.  
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Beyond individual reward schemes it is also possible to consider monetary 
compensations for reporting firms. Spagnolo (2004) shows that in the context of a stationary 
environment (probability of condemnation without LPs fixed over time) and with a budget-
balancing constraint, a first best solution (complete deterrence without any prosecution costs) 
can be achieved by giving to the first reporting firm a reward equal to the sum of the fines 
levied on the remaining cartel members (courageous leniency). Such rewards make leniency 
particularly attractive and hence weaken cartel stability. For Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) 
granting rewards eliminates the leniency counterproductive effect of cartel stabilization. Also 
Houba et al. (2009) defends that an effective ex-ante LP involves necessarily rewards, which 
should differ depending on cartel‟s economical sector, offering just the minimal amount 
necessary to induce self-reporting. Finally, according with Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) 
the inclusion of rewarding schemes makes the minimum fine with deterrence effect fall to low 
levels. To be more precise, below 10 percent of the optimal fine estimated by Becker (1968) 
on which must of the previous works have focused. By considering that antitrust sanctions are 
influenced (or should be) by the presence of different leniency and whistleblowers schemes, 
they show that previous simulations exaggerate the minimum fine necessary to ensure 
deterrence effects, since ignore the different types of deterrence that LP presupposes.  
Regarding the relation between individual and corporate leniency, Festerling (2005) 
presents a rich dynamic duopoly model with the aim of study its interaction in the US. In his 
model each firm has a hierarchical structure composed by a principal, firm owners and a 
manager where there are conflict of objectives regarding the legal consequences of 
conviction.  The author states that individual leniency is effective once that it induces firms to 
self-report due to treats of individual managers. Therefore, as said by Hammond (2004), “the 
real value of the individual leniency program is not the number of individual reports received 
but the number of corporate application that it generates”. Thereby, corporate and individual 
sanctions leniency policies give rise to a multistage revelation game in which either the 
manager or the firm owner can report. 
2.1.8 Perverse effects of LPs – Cartel stabilization 
Some authors have adverted for the stabilization effect that LPs can have on cartels 
whose formation was not deterred. Since LPs make self-reporting more attractive, the threat 
of self-reporting to punish a deviated cartel member may become credible. Therefore, some 
LPs designs may be faced by cartel members as a punishment mechanism that avoids 
deviation and helps in the cartel stabilization. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) show that 
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„„moderate‟‟ forms of leniency can have this counterproductive effect which facilitates illegal 
transactions. As in Spagnolo (2004), here “moderate” leniency means that it only eliminate or 
reduce self-reporting fines to a level below that the one faced in case of no report, which is 
indeed what is often implemented in the real world. Also Chen and Harrington (2007) through 
its aforementioned numerical simulation show that for intermediate and low levels of leniency 
collusion may end up stabilized, since LPs are only used as a resource in case of detection. 
Considering that the information that can constitute evidence of the collusive behaviour is 
durable, Spagnolo (2000b) finds that LPs can enforce collusive agreements in multi-unit 
auctions. Once more, LP confers credibility to the threat of report in case of deviation. 
Similarly,  the analysis of Ellis and Wilson (2001) suggests that  LP has the effect of 
stabilizing the cartels that were not deterred, which  turns out to be the ones with worse social 
welfare consequences and ,therefore, the most important to deter. 
Spagnolo (2004) refers other feature of LP design that can enhance cartel stabilization, 
which is to fine firms that have deviated from a cartel agreement. Thereby, by prosecuting 
firms that have unilaterally deviate from a cartel, AA may end up contributing to the cartels 
stabilization since it reduces firms‟ expected defecting gains. Indeed, if cartel members know 
that they will not be punished for their past collusive behaviour if they defect, they have an 
incentive to do so, making cartels harder to sustain. 
2.1.9 Private damage actions 
Leniency in principal does not immunise cartel members against the risk of exposure 
to civil damages actions in private suits. There is a legal debate that tries to discuss at what 
extend private action for damages may reduce LPs‟ attractiveness.  If the cooperation with 
AA increases the likelihood that cartel victims will successfully reclaim private damages, this 
could have a negative effect on LPs effectiveness. The evidence provided by the leniency 
applicant may be used by claimants to prove the existence of the infringements and its effects. 
Therefore, the incentive to apply for leniency to avoid fines may be counterbalance by the 
disincentive of being condemned to pay private damages.  
Spagnolo (2004) showed that is optimal to minimize the damages paid by the first 
reporter in order to increase the deterrence effect of LP. However, the author does not 
addresses the question of how much information from the LP report should be made available 
to cartel victims in order for them to exercise their right of compensation. In turn, Buccirossi, 
Marvão and Spagnolo (2015) present a more complete analysis, extending the approach of 
Spagnolo (2004) by determining the optimal combination of damage liability of the reporting 
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firm and the amount of information which should be provided to claimants. They show that 
limiting private damages is not necessary to preserve the effectiveness of LP and may have a 
counterproductive effect. To maximize the deterrence effect and the LP attractiveness it is 
optimal to minimize (or eliminate) the damage liability of cartel members that received 
immunity and maximize claimant‟s access to evidence collected under LP. Thus, under the 
author‟s proposal the damage liability of leniency applicant is assumed by the other cartel 
members as long as they are able to jointly cover the amount of compensations.    
 
2.1.10 Global Cartels and LP in the context of multi-markets 
Other relevant issue is when AA deal with global cartels which operate at an 
international level. This may arise some questions regarding the cooperation between AA of 
different jurisdictions. According to Connor (2009) there were 516 official investigations of 
suspect international cartels between 1990 and 2008 with total effected sales estimated at $16 
trillion. Other relevant data is that three quarters of the cartel cases between 1996 and 2005 
opened by the EC due to leniency were also under investigation in the US, indicating that a 
significant proportion were already discovered or at most close to detection (Arlman 2005). 
According to Spagnolo (2008), this fact does not mean that the EC should not grant full 
amnesty, even if they had already information about the cartel. The reasoning is that 
providing leniency to cartels that was already detected in other jurisdiction encourages self-
reporting there which facilitates the detection of international cartels. 
In this sense, antitrust cooperation and information sharing between authorities plays 
an important role. Hammond (2003) emphasized the need of local authorities share 
information regarding their cartel prosecution saying that “we must share leads and 
information, coordinate our investigative strategies and must gain access to subjects, evidence 
and witnesses that are located outside our borders”. However he also stressed that information 
sharing might be limited specially the obtained under LPs. In this context, Jay Pil Choi and 
Heiko Gerlach (2012) analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives of firms 
operating in several geographical markets and under different antitrust jurisdictions. In this 
sense, the question of how much information and of which type should AA share to fight 
cartels effectively is addressed.  Considering a repeated price game with two firms operating 
under different antitrust jurisdictions three scenarios are analyzed. The first is the benchmark 
in which AA are not coordinated not sharing any information about their investigations. The 
second scenario allows sharing between authorities but not the information obtained under 
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LP. Finally, in the third scenario AA share cartel leads, information from procedural 
investigation and from leniency applications. Their results show that when authorities are not 
sharing any information global firms report less, being easier to sustain a cartel compared to 
strictly local firms. On the other hand, when authorities cooperate by sharing leads and case 
information, excluded the obtained from LP, the probability of detection and the probability 
of conviction increases in each local market. This increases self-reporting and reduces cartel 
formation. Regarding the extensive information sharing it decreases the number of leniency 
applicants if fines and the probability of conviction are low and increases self-reporting and 
deters cartel formation if they are high. Therefore, in the absence of confidentiality 
agreements with local lenient applicants, the cartel strategy of self-reporting may no longer be 
optimal.   
2.2 Empirical studies 
A second category of literature on LP is empirical economics which provides tools 
that are useful in the identification of collusive markets. Moreover, it allows testing existing 
theories regarding their structural assumptions.  Probably due to the difficulty in the collection 
of reliable data by the empirical researcher, experimental and econometric studies available 
on the effects of leniency in antitrust is much more limited then theory studies. Indeed, 
empirical analysis must be treated with precaution since the whole population of cartels 
cannot be observed, thus samples may be biased because its dependency on prosecution as a 
mean of sample selection. In this context, we are in a presence of a self-selection problem, 
since it is not possible to observe all the cartels but only those that are detected. Therefore, it  
is hard to identify whether overall deterrence has been improved due to LPs and which types 
of cartels are more likely to be discovered and reported. In the following section are present 
some of the more relevant experimental and econometric studies. 
2.2.1Experimental studies 
Experimental studies are highly indicated for LPs analysis especially which regards 
general deterrence effects. Apesteguia, Dufwemberg and Selten (2007) provided the first 
experimental study addressing the effectiveness of LPs. They developed a stylized theoretical 
framework that aimed to capture the main features of the direct effects of LP on cartel 
deterrence present in the theoretical literature, undertaking an experimental analysis of such 
effects. Using a market game in form of a one-shot Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous 
goods they test four legal frameworks for antitrust legislation (ideal, standard, leniency and 
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bonus) which they call experimental treatments. In the ideal treatment there is no antitrust law 
and communication between firms and consequently cartel formation is impossible. The 
second is the standard treatment wherein firms face a fine in case of conviction, and there is 
no reduction if they report. The third is the leniency treatment upon which reporting firms 
receive a fine reduction. And finally, in the Bonus treatment reporting firms receive a reward 
that is a percentage of the fines collected from the other firms. The experimental results 
suggest that LPs are able to deter cartel formation and induce self-reporting, which leads to a 
more competitive outcome and are. However, the results also show that firms use the threat of 
report in case of deviation as a way to ensure the sustainability of collusion. Surprisingly, 
results show that rewarding does not increase deterrence. Indeed, is in the Bonus treatment 
where are found the highest number of cartels and market prices. The oligopoly game used is 
not repeated which does not allow agents to learn the game. This may be in the origin of some 
counterintuitive results as agents not reacting to rewards.   
Hinloopen and Soevent (2006) provide a more advanced experimental design that 
intends to overcome some shortcomings present in Apesteguia, Dufwemberg and selten 
(2007). In Hinloopen and Soevent (2006) firms play for at least 20 periods in a discrete 
homogenous goods Bertrand price game rather than a one-shot Bertrand which allows 
overcoming the problem of overstating the positive effect of LPs due to the non existence of 
reporting costs. It also creates a “race to report” situation, as larger fine reductions are granted 
to first reporters and introduces an exogenous probability that cartels are detected by AA. The 
experimental results show that LPs undermine the trust among potential colluders which 
traduces in fewer cartels established (significant direct deterrence effect). The lifetime of 
cartels that were not deterred are shortened when a LP is in place, since they are less 
successful in sustaining collusive prices having lower survival rates. Indeed, there is an 
increase in price cuts performed by cartel members that deviate. Finally, the data provides no 
evidence that LPs have an attenuation effect on cartel recidivism, since the same percentage 
of convicted cartels starts colluding again after some time with and without LP. 
In contrast, the experimental study undertaken by Bigoni et al. (2012) show that 
leniency performs poorly. The results show that the introduction of LPs increase collusive 
prices and stabilize the surviving cartels. However, leniency reduces recidivism, since in the 
experiment cartels are almost never reformed. The exclusion of ringleaders from LPs does not 
influence the deterrence effect of leniency but increase the price level. The results also 
suggest that rewarding whistleblowers is the only policy that is able to reduce collusive prices 
and seems to improve welfare. In this experiment firms are allowed to self-report before price 
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choices are observed by other firms and after which may be in the origin of these different 
results. 
Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005) analyzed the probability of being reported a cartel 
depending on the cartel size
5
 and the schedule of fine reductions. The experimental results 
show that LPs and cartel size are positively correlated, since the larger the cartel the more 
effective is the program in their dissolving. Cartels with seven members become unstable with 
LPs, being that the estimated average cartel size is six. Also find that change the coverage of 
reduced fine, this is whether leniency applies just to the first reported or to all reporters, seems 
to have no significant effect on the program effectiveness in inducing cartel members to self-
report for both cartel size cases.  
2.2.2 Econometric studies 
Steffen Brenner (2009) provides one of the most relevant econometric analyses on 
LPs, which examines the efficiency of the 1996LN considering its effects on the number of 
applications, the size of the fines applied to infringers and the duration of AA investigation. 
Also study if a LP is well succeed on extracting information from cartel members and if 
increases cartel deterrence. Uses the duration of the investigations as a proxy for their cost 
and assumes that the imposition of higher fines is a signal of better information available in 
prosecution process.  His results suggest that LPs provide incentives for cartel members to 
reveal information on their collusive activities, which supports the theoretical analysis of the 
most relevant literature as Motta and Polo (2004), Spagnolo (2004) and Aubert, Rey and 
Koravic (2006) analyzed previously. Despite that LPs help to increase the information 
collected and thus impose higher fines, is also found that these are not high enough to 
increase cartel deterrence. The author does not find any significant effect on the speed of 
completion of the investigation. The empirical research does not support the view that LP 
destabilizes cartels decreasing their duration. Likewise Arlman (2005) performs an empirical 
study about the 1996LN. The results show that leniency is effective destroying long lasting 
hard cover cartels, since cartels involving full immunity had a higher duration that cartels 
involving partial immunity. The econometric analysis also suggests that leniency decreases 
significantly the duration of the investigation and increases fines. However, leniency does not 
provide more and better information about the cartel. In the interpretation of this result we 
should take into account that the author uses the number of words in the final decision as a 
                                                             
5 Are considered two cases: a small (with two cartel members) and a large (with seven) 
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proxy for quantity and quality of information. This is a debatable assumption, once one can 
consider plausible to assume that when the evidence is very strong the decision is more 
concise and then uses less words. Hereupon, both Brenner (2009) and Arlman (2005) 
concluded that leniency has a positive impact in the number of cartel detected, however none 
of them was able to find conclusive evidence of a deterrence effect each one of them using a 
different method to proxy for it. This fact may just reflect difficult assessment of this issue. 
Nevertheless, Miller (2007) was able to provide evidence that LP might have positive effects 
on deterrence. He developed a theoretical model of cartel behaviour and then provided 
empirical predictions. The results are obtained through a direct estimation of the model via 
the method of moments. The results from the statistical tests are consistent with the notion 
that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. Through the study of the US 
cartel cases between 1985 and 2005 he shows that the number of cartels detected increased 
significantly after the introduction of the USLP in 1993. This pattern is consistent with 
enhanced cartel detection and improved deterrence. However, despite this study be a large 
step in the provision of substantial evidence that LP lead to more deterrence and less 
collusion, results are still only derived by data from detected cartels. 
In a more recent study Marvão (2014) analyses the ECLP using as a data set the cartels 
convicted between 1998 and 2011. The results confirm that the first reporter receives much 
higher fine reductions, independently of the timing of the application (before or after an 
investigation is underway). Also conclude that repeat offenders receive higher reductions, 
which suggest that firms learn how to play the game in the sense that they report or cooperate 
with higher quality. Recidivists often collude with the same set of firms and seem to agree on 
reporting the cartel in turns, since they accept to collude again with the firms who reported 













3.  The European Commission’s Leniency Program  
3.1 Legal Framework 
The first LP was introduced in the US in 1978. The program lacked transparency 
giving a high discretionary power to DOJ in its implementation. The resulting uncertainty 
acted as deterrent to potential applicants and the program received few applications. To 
increase its attractiveness, DOJ introduced significant changes in the 1993 revision. It started 
to grant complete amnesty to the first firm reporting before an investigation is underway, 
showing more clearly the benefits for the applicants. Amnesty to firms that reported the cartel 
after the opening of the investigation was also allowed, provided that at the time the DOJ 
lacked enough evidence to convict wrongdoers. Moreover, firms that were not able to obtain 
leniency for the involvement in one cartel, might obtain full immunity if they reported a new 
cartel as well as obtain a substantial fine reduction regarding the first cartel. In 1994, the DOJ 
extended the coverage of corporate LP to individuals allowing managers and other employees 
to self-report and contribute with additional useful information, but also made them 
susceptible to obtain jail sentences. After these revisions the number of applications increased 
from 1 per year to 3 per month on average and the level of fines imposed also increased 
(Spagnolo, 2008).  
Following the example of the US the EC introduced his first LP in 1996. The 1996LN 
allowed a non-imposition of fine or very substantial reduction (75-100%) to the first firm 
reporting an undetected cartel, a substantial reduction (50-75%) to parties offering an 
irrefutable prove after the EC had undertaken an investigation and a significant reduction (10-
50%) to late comers that cooperated with the EC providing useful information. To be entitled 
to a non-imposition of fine or very substantial reduction a firm had to end its cartel 
involvement at least at the moment of the cartel disclosure, had to provide the EC with all 
relevant information cooperating in a complete and continuous basis and must not have acted 
as an instigator or played a determining role in the cartel. This notice had a retroactive effect 
meaning that it might be applied to investigations started before 1996 but, at the time, without 
a final decision. It did not cover applications from individual employees, just persons 
empowered to represent the reporting firm. Disappointing the expectations, this notice failed 
exactly in the same point as the first American program. The program had not allowed firms 
to clearly assess which fine reduction they would receive if they report or cooperate, since 
fine reductions were uncertain and discretional. In this sense, the EC revised the program 
introducing the 2002LN. The objectives were to increase generosity, transparency and 
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coverage of the program. Therefore, the program started to grant automatically total immunity 
to the first undertaking reporting the cartel before an investigation was open. Likewise, the 
notice allowed full amnesty to cartel members reporting after the opening of an investigation 
provided that the EC did not have any relevant information about the cartel. The boundaries 
of fine reductions were re-designed depending on the time at which the evidence was 
disclosed and the added value it represents. To the first firm to disclose valuable information a 
reduction of 30-50% is granted, to the second a reduction of 20-30% and to subsequent firms 
a reduction up to 20%. The program coverage was extended also to ringleaders provided that 
they did not have exerted a coercive power to force other firms to join the cartel. This notice 
replaced the 1996LN for the new cases, not having a retroactive effect.  
On December 2006 another revision was made through the 2006LN which increased 
the level of specification regarding the information firms must provide to obtain immunity. 
This notice required that applicants provided a „detailed description of the alleged cartel 
arrangement, including for instance its aims, activities and functioning; the product or service 
concerned, the geographic scope, the duration and the estimated market volumes(…)”. It also 
demanded the disclosure of names and addresses of the applicant and all the other cartel 
members, as well as names, positions and office locations of all individuals whose have been 
involved in the cartel. Finally, it required information on which other AA have been 
approached or are intended to be regarding the infringement. Other change introduced by this 
notice is that applicants cannot disclose its participation on the program until the EC found it 
appropriated which may imply the continuity of the applicant in the cartel after its disclosure.  
Regarding private damage actions, the ECLP does not protect leniency applicants from 
civil law consequences of their participation in the cartel. Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust 
damage actions has the purpose of ensuring that each cartel victim can effectively exercise its 
right for compensation. The Directive confirms the leniency applicants‟ liability, however 
immunity recipients have its liability limited „to its direct or indirect purchasers or providers‟ 
(Art. 11 n.4 a)). The Directive also shows the EC concern in protecting leniency material, 
prohibiting the disclosure of leniency statement for damage actions purposes (Art. 6 n.6).
6
 In 
Table 1 and 1.1 in appendix II contains a comparison between the 3 European‟ leniency 
notices and the USLP and the guidelines for fines setting.  
 
 
                                                             
6 See Directive 2014/104/EU in appendix I.  
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3.2 What do we know about ECLP evolution and effectiveness?  
To address this issue a data set on ECLP was built. It is composed by 139 cartel cases 
that were decided by the EC between 1980 and 2015 falling under Art. 101 of the TFEU, or 
Art. 81 of the EC Treaty or further back Art. 85. A total of 957 firms were convicted during 
the 36 years considered. In this analysis are only considered the cases in which a fine was 
imposed. The information was collected from the publications available on the DG 
competition website
7
 which includes press releases, summary decision and non-confidential 
versions of final decisions. From each case the same variables were collected, namely, cartel 




, cartel duration, timing of leniency 
application and fine reductions granted.  
In the period analyzed were detected an average of 3,9 cases and convicted 26,6 firms 
per year. The average cartel size
10
 obtained was 7,1 members which is above the estimation of 
six members obtained in the experimental study of Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005). 
Comparing the period afore the introduction of the first LP (1980–1996) with the period after 
its introduction (1996 –2015), we observe a higher cartel size in the first period (9,4) than in 
the second (6,2). As mentioned, Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005) found that cartels with 
seven or more members become unstable with the introduction of LPs. The data suggest that 
LPs reduce cartel size, however it should not be forgotten that it is only related to detected 
cartels, which limits the analysis. The average number of cases initiated per year and the fines 
level are the variables in which is verified a more significant increase after the introduction of 
the 1996LN: from 2,5 to 5,3 and 1,5 million Euros to 43 million Euros per firm, respectively. 
(See figures 1 and 2 in appendix II.) The duration of the investigation increased from 3 years 
and 3 months to 4 years with the introduction of LPs. However, the duration per firm 
decreased from 11 to 10 months which is more relevant to analyze since there is a positive 
correlation between cartel size and investigation duration. This result is consistent with 
Brenner (2005) and contrasts with Arlman (2005), since 1 month is not a significant 
difference.  Investigation is facilitated with firms cooperation, but prosecution becomes more 
time consuming. Regarding cartel duration, before the introduction of the 1996LN cartels 
lasted on average 6 years and after its implementation 7 years and 5 months. (See table 2 in 
                                                             
7 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/  
8 Measured in months 
9 Fines are considered after applied all the reductions and is measured in million Euros 





Motchenkova (2004) suggested that if LPs were generous to subsequent 
reporters, which is the case of the ECLP, the duration of the cartel will increase.       
Focusing the analysis on the period with leniency (1996 –2015), in the first 5 years of 
the program there was no case with full immunity. In contrast in the last 5 years, with 
exception for 2014, in all cases full immunity has been granted. (See figure 3 in appendix II.). 
Between 1996 and 2015 in 64% of cartel cases a firm received full immunity, 28% a fine 
reduction <100 and in only 8% of the cases any fine reduction was granted. Looking at the 
firms convicted, 53% received fine reductions and the remaining 47% did not received any 
reduction. (See figure 4 in appendix II.) The reduction between ]20,40] is the one with higher 
proportion (18%) followed by the reduction between ]0,20] (16%) and by full immunity 
(10%). (See figure 5 in appendix II.) Regarding the timing of the leniency application, 72% of 
the cases were reports before an investigation was open and the remaining 28% refers to cases 
in which occurred cooperation after the opening of the investigation. (See figure 7 in 
appendix II.) The duration of the investigation does not seem to be much affected by the 
timing of the leniency application. For the cases in which the report is before the investigation 
its duration is, on average, 3 years and 11 months and for the cases with cooperation more 2 
months. The level of fines imposed is higher in the first case (€261 million) than in the second 
case (€210 million). And is even lower in the cases in which has not existed leniency (€149 
million). This may suggest that the quality of information is superior in the cases started due 
to reports allowing setting higher fines. Finally, cartel duration is significantly higher for the 
cases in which a report by a cartel member occur (8 years and 4 months) comparing with the 
situation in which the opening of the case is by the EC initiative (5 years and 7 months with 
fine reduction due to cooperation and 4 years and 10 months without leniency). This may 
suggests that LPs induce more long lasting cartels to report than cartels with lower duration, 
which is in accordance with the conclusion of Arlman (2005). (See table 3 in appendix II.)  
To conclude this descriptive statistics it is relevant to compare the performance of the 
three notices. The 1996LN underperformed on inducing firms to self-report, especially in the 
first years, having a average number of cases initiated due to reports per year of 2,8 which 
increased to 4,2 with the 2002LN  and to 4,9 with the 2006LN. Similarly, the proportion of 
investigations started due to firms‟ reports increased from 52% with the 1996LN to 71% with 
the 2002LN and to 86% with the 2006LN.  (See figure 8 and Table 4 in appendix II.) The 
2006LN registers the lowest investigation‟s duration, 8 months than in 1996LN and 11 




3.3 Room for improvement?  
Following the previous analysis it way suggested that there are some issues in the 
design and implementation of the program that deserve further consideration. The first 
concern that springs out is the existence of innumerable repeated offenders, meaning firms 
which were convicted for more than one cartel. Indeed, in the period analyzed 24% of the 
total convicted firms were repeated offenders. (See table 6 in appendix II.) The legal 
framework has two contradictory approaches, since by one side recidivism is one of the 
aggravating circumstances that increase fines imposed to repeated offenders, by the other side 
they are allowed to apply for leniency and get full immunity or fine reductions under the same 
conditions as the other cartel members. This implies that in one cases penalization for 
recidivism exceeds the leniency reduction as occurred in the elevators and escalators cartel 
convicted in 2007 wherein Thyssen Krupp received a 50% increase for being a repeated 
offender and a 20% reduction under the LP. In other cases one effect cancels the other as in 
the organic peroxide case (2003) wherein Atochem received a 50% leniency reduction and a 
50% aggravation for recidivism. Finally, in other cases the penalization for recidivism is 
milder than the leniency reduction. For example on the Chloroprene Rubber cartel (2007) 
Bayer received full immunity and an increase of 60% for recidivism. This trade-off needs to 
be carefully assessed, but first it‟s crucial to discuss the concept of recidivism. In the 2006LN 
recidivism constitutes an aggravating circumstance if „an undertaking continues or repeats the 
same or a similar infringement after the Commission(…)has made a finding that the 
undertaking infringed Articles 101 or 102 of TFEU‟. In order to discuss the EC‟ application 
of this concept let us analyze firms Akzo Nobel and Degussa. When was initiated the 
investigation of the first cartel in which Akzo took part (Sodium Gluconate I), this firm was 
involved in other 6 cartels.
11
. All these cartels ended before the first case 'decision date, thus 
was not applied any fine aggravation due to recidivism in those six subsequent decisions. In 
2009 Akzo was convicted for another cartel whose formation is posterior to the first 
conviction, whereby a 100% fine aggravation was applied. Now let's see what happens with 
Degussa who was convicted on seven occasions. After being convicted for the first time in 
1984 (peroxygen products cartel), Degussa joined other four cartels for which received a 50% 
fine aggravation, with exception for the methionine cartel (2002) in which  did not received 
any fine increase. This constitutes an inconsistency in the light of what the notice foresees and 
                                                             




is applied in the case of Akzo. Thereby, the EC reveals some ambiguity in the determination 
of the undertakings that are considered repeated offenders. Degussa was also convicted in 
2003 by a cartel that despite having started before the first conviction in 1984 ended only in 
1999 whereby an increase of 50% was correctly applied. (See tables 7 and 8 in appendix II.) 
Retaking the trade-off, imposing higher fines to recidivists seems reasonable because they 
have higher propensity to commit the infringement and can learn from the first prosecution 
process which can give them an advantage to better hide the infringement or prepare their 
defence. Moreover, a recidivist deserves a moral condemnation for its behaviour. However, to 
give, under LP, the same treatment to recidivists as to first offenders is a different question 
and requires some attention. One option is its exclusion from LPs as stipulated in the Greek 
LP until its revision in 2011
12
. This not seems to be an effective option since can have the 
counter-productive effect of encouraging recidivism. The reasoning is that if we consider the 
extreme case wherein a cartel is exclusively composed by repeated offenders, their exclusion 
from leniency would protect the cartel from the positive enforcement effects of the program, 
becoming it easier to maintain and more difficult to detect. Thereby, a convicted cartel has 
more incentives to re-establish. As seen in the literature, Chen and Rey (2012) also do not 
support the idea of prohibiting leniency for repeated offenders. Marvão (2014) considers that 
LPs should be less generous regarding how recidivists are treated. Accordingly, we suggest 
that the EC should continue to accept immunity applications from recidivists. However, in the 
cases wherein recidivists only cooperate with the AA after opening the investigation it‟s 
plausible to still grant a fine reduction, provided it does not cancel the effect of the 
aggravating circumstance. Therefore, should be applied a fine increment between 100 and 
50% due to recidivism and a fine reduction up to 50% under the LP. The fine aggravation 
should be harsher for „pure‟ recidivists
13
 (e.g 100%) and milder for the ones that once catch 
by the AA did not revealed their past or current involvement on other cartels. Note that this is 
a broader concept of recidivism than the one used by the EC. When a 50% increase is applied 
for recidivism the fine reduction should be lower than 50%.  In this way, leniency is able to 
still induce firms to cooperate with AA after the cartel discovering, but it also punishes the 
recidivism behaviour.  
                                                             
12 See http://www.epant.gr/img/  
13 Firms that after being caught and convicted return to a collusive agreement in the same on in other market 
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Besides punishing firms that when convicted for their participation in one cartel do not 
report their involvement in other cartels
14
, LPs should compensate generously the ones who 
report. Actually, US legislation provides that firms which were not able to obtain leniency for 
the involvement in one cartel, can obtain full immunity if they report a new cartel as well as 
obtain a substantial fine reduction regarding the first cartel. This is not applied by the EC 
since the maximum a firm can get from denouncing a new cartel is the immunity in that case, 
having no repercussions in the first cartel involvement. For example in 2001 the EC, after 
accomplishing its own initiative investigation, convicted four companies regarding the 
Belgian beer market cartel. One of the firms convicted (Interbrew) informed the EC about its 
participation in other cartel in the Netherland market and the existence of a similar cartel in 
the French market in which Interbrew had not participated. This information allowed the EC 
to convict both cartels and Interbrew received full immunity in the Netherland market cartel. 
However, regarding the initial case (Belgian Market) Interbrew only received a 30% fine 
reduction relative to its bilateral agreement with Alken-Maes and 50% relative to the private-
label beer cartel. The fact that this firm provided information that allowed discovering two 
more cartels was not taken into account in the reductions granted.  
The EC‟s legal framework is also driven by contradictory forces in the treatment of 
ringleaders. The EC considers that exerting a leading behaviour in a cartel is an aggravating 
circumstance. However, it also allows ringleaders to apply for leniency provided that it did 
not have exerted a coercive power in inducing other firms to enter the cartel, contrary to US 
that exclude them. For example, in the bitumen cartel convicted in 2007 Repsol and Pras 
received an increase of 30% in their fines for acted as co-leaders. However, in compensation 
for their cooperation they received a fine reduction under LP of 40% and 25%, respectively. 
In the case of Repsol the LP cancels the effect of the aggravating circumstance. In turn, for 
Pras the aggravation due to its leading behaviour prevails over the leniency reduction. As 
discussed in the literature review it is not a straightforward question whether to exclude or not 
ringleaders from LPs. A firm that behaves as a leader should have a higher fine relative to its 
minor partners. However, ringleaders are likely to be the ones with more valuable information 
for the EC. Thus, not excluding them from LPs is the most direct way to extract this 
information from them. Contrary to what happens in the recidivism context, in this case I 
consider that the fine reduction obtained under the LP should be allowed to exceed the fine 
aggravation for being a ringleader. The reasoning is that the advantage that arises from the 
                                                             
14 Even if its involvement has ended 
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possibility of obtaining more valuable information is higher than the damage caused by the 
behaviour of the ringleader in particular. In terms of social welfare it is much worse the 
damage caused by recidivism than by the fact that one cartel member behave as a ringleader 
since probably the cartel would have existed without its action. 
Other point that deserves some attention is that one of the requirements under the 
leniency notice to obtain full immunity is to keep confidential the collaboration with the EC 
until at least the starting of the inspections of the other undertakings. This requirement 
introduced by the 2006LN was an essential change to preserve the integrity and effectiveness 
of inspections. In fact, it is essential to ensure that the other cartel members are surprised by 
the AA inspections in order to avoid the destruction of incriminating evidences. In the Italian 
raw tobacco cartel (2006), Deltafina lost the amnesty because its chairman, besides being 
aware of the confidential commitment, voluntarily disclosed its immunity application to other 
two cartel members days before the starting of the investigations. This fact unleashed the 
leniency application of the two informed firms and jeopardized the effectiveness of the 
investigations.  In this sense, it is crucial to punish the undertakings that break the 
confidentiality agreement by excluding them from the program or granting them just a 
moderate fine reduction. However, looking at this question from the firm‟s perspective, 
impose punishments in this context can disincentive firms to apply for leniency, since there is 
some degree of difficulty in keeping an immunity application confidential. Thereby, it is 
important to guarantee that firms are only punished when is proved that the disclosure of 
information results undoubtedly of an intentional and voluntarily decision of the leniency 
applicant. 
As seen some authors defend the incorporation of a reward scheme on the design of 
LPs. South Korea has been a pioneer in this matter, having introduced a cash rewards scheme 
for individual whistleblowers in 2002. Initially the amount of the reward was too low to 
generate reports (the maximum was around $20,000). In November 2003 the ceiling was 
increased to $100,000 but generated only 5 reports until May 2005 when was increased to $1 
million (Spagnolo, 2008). In December 2012, the maximum reward was again increased to 
$2.8 million (Stephan, 2014). This possibility is until now discarded by the EC which seems 
to be a good option since its implementation entails some problems which limit its 
effectiveness. As seen in section 2.1.7, Aubert, Rey and Koravic (2006) explored the adverse 
effects of rewards as political implementation difficulties. Also some sociological literature 
points out the difficulties experienced by individual whistleblowers which inhibit them from 
reporting. Therefore, the high individual costs and risks associated with individual 
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whistleblowing imply that rewards would need to be extremely large in order for reporting to 
be worthwhile. And since measures for protection from retaliatory to employers are not easy 
to implement a rewarding scheme is not likely to be. However, its implementation in a 
corporate context should be considered by the EC, since as seen some authors defend that its 
introduction is the only way to avoid the undesirable cartel stabilization effect. 
Concerning the conflict between public and private enforcement we find two questions 
that should be addressed when to find the right balance between protection of LP and 
protection of cartel victims. The first question is whether leniency applicants and the other 
cartel members should be subject to the same treatment regarding its liability. The second is 
whether claimants should have access to documents and statements collected under the LP. 
Consider leniency applicants not liable for damages and give full access to leniency material 
would be the ideal solution to maximize LP‟s attractiveness. However it‟s not feasible since 
in 28% of the cases concluded by the EC after the introduction of LP all undertakings 
cooperated under LP. Thus if none of them is liable for damages, injured parties are not able 
to exert their right for compensation. If only full immunity recipients are not liable for 
damages and are the other undertakings who assume the compensations, as proposed by 
Buccirossi, Marvão and Spagnolo (2015), the incentives of these cartel members to cooperate 
with the EC will decrease under penalty of contribute with additional information that can be 
used against them in private damage actions. Therefore, the most reasonable option is to 
protect leniency material such that whether or not to participate in the program does not 
influence the information used by injured parties. Once leniency material is protected it‟s not 
necessary consider immunity recipients not liable for damages. However, partial limit its 
liability only to the harm caused by them seems reasonable. Indeed, this is the EC‟ approach.  
Another noteworthy observation is that besides the 2002LN started to grant full 
amnesty to cartel members that report after the case opening, in only one occasion this 
occurred. It was in the power transformers case (2009) that Siemens received full immunity 
for providing crucial information to the EC after the case opening.  
To conclude, despite the advances that presupposed the two revisions the EC should strive 
to design a notice even more specific. As seen during the application of the 2006LN the 
duration of the investigation was lower, which suggests that the introduction of specified 
guidelines regarding information requirements contributed positively to the acceleration of the 
leniency application process. Therefore, in further revisions the EC should attempt to increase 
the level of explicitness not only as a way to reduce the process time as to guarantee that firms 
clearly access the consequences they face with their application 
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4. Conclusions and further research  
LPs are a powerful weapon to fight against cartels. Eliminate or reduce fines for 
reporting firms has allowing AA to increase the number of convicted cartels and the level of 
fines imposed. This is evident in the EC case, in which the number of cases initiated per year 
increased, according to our descriptive statistics, from 2,5 to 5,3, on average, after the 
introduction of leniency. However, its introduction does not seem to reduce significantly 
investigations duration and therefore not reduce AA‟ costs. Moreover, the number of repeated 
offenders accounts for 24% of the convicted firms which evidences the importance of increase 
recidivists‟ punishment. Nevertheless, it exclusion from LPs can have the reverse effect of 
encouraging recidivism. Thereby, immunity should be available for repeated offenders, as 
well as fine reductions, but provided that the reduction due to leniency does not cancel the 
effect of the fine aggravation due to recidivism. The same applies to the ringleader‟s case, 
whose exclusion is even more damaging to LP effectiveness since they are, in principal, the 
cartel members with more valuable information for AA. Regarding private damage actions, 
protect leniency material and partially limit immunity recipients liability seems to be the best 
approach.  
The analyzed literature suggests that LPs must be generous to avoid the undesired 
effect of stabilize cartels and be able to induce firms to report higher quality information. The 
first reporter should receive the higher fine reduction or immunity, both before and after an 
investigation has been launched.  In addition, rewards may be considered, however they are 
better suited to firms than to individual whistleblowers. The reasoning is that the risk and cost 
for employees that report are very high whereby for rewards to be effective would need to be 
extremely large which becomes unfeasible its application. 
In summary, the ECLP seems to be effective, especially in cartel detection, but there is 
some scope for improvement.  Whether this increase in cartel detection is due to its 
effectiveness or just due to a rising of cartel activity remains a question for clarify, which 
demands further research. Experimental economics seems to be the most adequate to address 
this deterrence effect question. Also, the issue of recidivism was not much explored in 







5. Appendix I. – Legislation 
Sherman Act  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (1890) states that “every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. (...) shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 years‟ 
Article 101 of the TFEU 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular 
those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, 
and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
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(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. 
Directive 2014/104/EU 
Article 6 
Disclosure of evidence included in the file of a competition authority 
(...) 
6. Member States shall ensure that, for the purpose of actions for damages, national courts 
cannot at any time order a party or a third party to disclose any of the following categories of 
evidence:  
(a)  leniency statements; and  
(b)  settlement submissions. 
Article 11 
Joint and several liability 
1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings which have infringed competition law 
through joint behaviour are jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by the 
infringement of competition law; with the effect that each of those undertakings is bound to 
compensate for the harm in full, and the injured party has the right to require full 
compensation from any of them until he has been fully compensated. 
(...) 
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that an immunity 
recipient is jointly and severally liable as follows: (a)  to its direct or indirect purchasers or 
providers; and (b)  to other injured parties only where full compensation cannot be obtained 












Appendix II – Tables and Figures 
 
 1996 LN 2002 LN 2006 LN 1993/94 US 
When 
applicant 
must end its 
involvement 
in the cartel? 
 
„no later than the time 
at which it discloses 
the cartel‟ 
 
„no later than the time 
at which it submits 
evidence‟ 
„immediately following 
its application, except 
for what would, in the 
EC's view, be 
reasonably necessary to 
preserve the integrity 
of the inspections‟ 
„prompt and effective 
action to end its 
participation in the 
activity‟. 
Participation can 








„only on its adoption 
of a decision‟ 
„once the commission 
has received the 
information and 
evidence (...) and has 
verified that it meets 
the conditions‟ 
„once the commission 
has received the 
information and 
evidence (...) and has 
verified that it meets 
the conditions‟ 
Assistant Attorney 
General for litigation 
makes final decision 























30-50% first  
20-30% second 
up to 20% subsequent 
YES 
30-50% first  
20-30% second 
up to 20% subsequent 
NO 
But reductions for 
cooperation can  be 








Just fine reduction  
50-75% 
YES 
„on the condition that 
the EC did not have 
sufficient evidence‟ 
YES 
„on the condition that 
the EC did not have 
sufficient evidence‟ 
YES 
DOJ 'does not have 
evidence (…) that is 









„is the first to adduce 
decisive evidence of 
the cartel‟s existence‟ 
„first to submit 
evidence which in the 
EC‟s view may 
enable it to adopt a 
decision to  carry out 
an investigation‟ or 
„find an 
infringement‟ 
„first to submit 
information and 
evidence which in the 
EC‟s view will enable 
it to carry out a 
targeted inspection‟ or 
„find an infringement‟ 
The information 












another enterprise to 
take part in the cartel 
and has acted as 
instigator or played 
determining role‟ 
 
„take steps to coerce 
other undertakings to 
participate in the 
infringement‟ 
 
„took steps to coerce 
other undertakings 
to join the cartel or to 
remain in it‟ 
„coerced another 
party to participate in 
the illegal activity or 
clearly was the leader 





„does not therefore 







„leniency will be 






LP „cannot protect an 
enterprise from civil 
LP „cannot protect an 
undertaking from 
LP „cannot protect an 
undertaking from civil 
ACPERA limits 
private damage 
Table 1 – Comparison between 1996, 2002, 2006 leniency notices and the 1993/1994 US LP 
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Damage law consequences‟ civil law 
consequences‟ 
law consequences‟ 
Limited liability -  
Directive 2014/104/EU 
actions – amnesty 
recipients are not 
liable for treble 





Step 1 – Set Basic Amount (x+y) 
 Gravity of offense (x) 
o Minor (€1000 – €1million ) 
o Serious (€1 – €20 million ) 
o Very serious (above 20€ million) 
 Duration Infringement (y) 
o ≤ 1 year – not increase fine 
o 1-5 years – increase by 50% 
o More 5 years – increase 10% for 
each year after the 5
th
  
Step 2 – Consider aggravating & Attenuating 
factors  
 Aggravating – recidivism, leading role, 
obstruction EC investigation, retaliatory 
behaviour against other  undertakings; 
among others 
 Attenuating – passive role, non-
implementation of the offending 
agreement, termination of the 
infringement as soon as the EC 
intervenes, infringement committed as a 
result of negligence; among others  
Step 3 – legal maximum fine – 10% of total 
turnover  
Step 4 – Leniency Reductions   
 
 
Step 1 – Set Basic Amount (x*y) 
 Value relevant sales  (x) – Is 
considered a proportion up to 30% of 
the annual value of sales depending 
on the degree of gravity of the 
infringement  
 Duration Infringement (y) – number 
years and months the infringement 
lasted 
 Additional basic amount („entry 
free‟) – sum between 15-25% of the 
value of sales used as an additional 
deterrent effect 
Step 2 – Consider aggravating & 
Attenuating factors  
 Aggravating – recidivism, leading 
role, obstruction EC investigation, 
retaliatory behaviour against other  
undertakings; among others 
 Attenuating – passive role, non-
implementation of the offending 
agreement, termination of the 
infringement as soon as the EC 
intervenes, infringement committed 
as a result of negligence; among 
others  
Step 3 – legal maximum fine – 10% of total 
turnover  



























N. cases initiated per year 2,5 5,3 
Cartel Size 9,4 6,2 
Duration Investigation (months) 39 48 
Duration Investigation/firm (months) 11,5 9,6 
Fines (million €) 16,078981 236,540854 
Fines/Firm (million €) 1,482083 42,991724 






































































































































































Figure 1 – Number of Cartel Investigations Started  

























































































































































Figure 2 – Average Fines per firm   
Note: In 1993 and 1997 there were no concluded cases 


















































Fine reduction < 100
Without leniency
Figure 3 – Number of cartel cases convicted after the introduction of the 1996LN   
Note: In 1996 there were concluded two cartel cases however one was before the notice (18/07/1996), thus is not considered 
here  
Figure 4 – Cartel Cases concluded after the introduction of the 1996 Leniency Notice   











































Cartel Size 6,3 5,7 6,4 
Duration Investigation (months) 47 49 49 
Duration Investigation/firm (months) 9 10 10 
Fines (million €) 261,151543 209,516140 149,055300 
Fines/Firm (million €) 41,101298 47,910094 42,605480 





Figure 7 – Timing of the leniency application   
Figure 6 – Firms Convicted after the introduction of the 1996 Leniency Notice   












Number Cases started 
due to reports 
excluding under 
investigation cases
Number Cases started 
due to report 
considering under 
investigation cases as 
reported
 
AA Initiative   




 Without Leniency  Total 
Number of 
Cases started 
% Number of Cases 
started 
% Number of 
Cases started 
% Number of 
Cases started 
% 
1996 LN  17 52 11 33 5 15 33 37 
2002 LN  20 71 7 25 1 4 28 31 
2006 LN  25 86 2 7 2 7 29 32 

















 1996 LN 2002 LN 2006 LN 
Number Cases initiated per year* 5,5 7,0 4,4 
Number Cases initiated due to reports per year** 2,8 4,2 4,9 
Cartel Size 6,2 7,0 5,3 
Duration Investigation (months) 49 52 41 
Duration Investigation/firm (months) 9,4 10,0 9,1 
Fines (million €) 123,140 369,288 294,474 
Fines/Firm (million €) 20,367 68,117 55,780 
Duration Cartel (months) 98 94 68 
 
Table 4 - Comparison of the 1996, 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices regarding the detection method   
 
 Note: The cases under investigation are not included since the AA only publishes in the final decision if the investigation was 
started due to a leniency report or to its own initiative.  
  Figure 8 – Number of cartel investigations started due to firm‟ reports    
 
 Note: The AA only publishes in the final decision if the investigation was started due to a leniency report or to its own initiative 
therefore the cases under investigation are accounted using two approaches  
  
* Includes the cases under investigation and the cases open by the AA initiative. 
** The cases under investigation are all considered as reported cases.  
Note: 2015 is not included in the calculation of the number of cases per year, since the year is not completed. 
  







Akzo Nobel 8 
Degussa 7 







Aventis (Rhône-Poulenc) 4 
BASF 4 
Total 4 
Hitachi/Hitachi Metals  3 
Hoechst 3 
Prym  3 
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) 3 
Repsol 3 
Asahi Glass 3 
SGL 3 
Du pont/ Dow 3 
Eni 3 





Fuji Electrics 2 
Sumitomo Electic Industries 2 
LG Electronics 2 
Panasonic 2 
Thyssenkrupp 2 
Nippon Steel 2 
Hoffman-La Roche  2 
Sumitomo Chemical 2 
Ajinomoto 2 
Takeda Chemical 2 
Coats 2 
Interbrew (Inbev) 2 









AC Treuhand 2 
Saint-Gobain 2 
Tokai Carbon 2 
SAS 2 
Pikington 2 







FMC  2 











Sodium Gluconate I 1997-2001 1987-1995 20% 0% 
Organic Peroxide 2000-2003 1971-1999 100% 0% 
Choline Chloride 1999-2004 1992-1998 30% 0% 
Monochloroacetic Acid 1999-2005 1984-1999 35% 0% 
Hydrogen Peroxide 2002-2006 1994-2000 40% 0% 
Sodium Chlorate 2003-2008 1994-2000 100% 0% 
Heat stabilisers 2003-2009 1991-2000 0% 0% 











Peroxygen Products 1880-1984 1961-1980 n.a 0% 
Polypropylene 1983-1986 1977-1983 n.a 0% 
Methionine  1999-2002 1986-1999 25% 0% 
Organic Peroxide 2000-2003 1971-1999 25% 50% 
Methacrylates 2002-2006 1997-2002 100% 50% 
Hydrogen Peroxide 2002-2006 1994-2000 100% 50% 




Table 7– Cartel cases wherein Akzo Nobel participated    
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